Friday News Roundup — June 14, 2024
By James Kitfield
This week President Joe Biden traveled to Italy for a G-7 Summit, where the United States and its democratic allies focused their attention on supporting Ukraine in its ongoing fight against Russian aggression. For embattled Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who attended the summit as a guest, it was a welcome opportunity to regain the attention of Western leaders after months when they have been focused primarily on the Israeli-Hamas conflict in Gaza.
On the sidelines of the summit, Biden and Zelensky signed a bilateral security pact that commits the United States to supporting Ukraine for ten years with continued military assistance, weapons production, intelligence sharing, and training for the Ukrainian armed forces. Biden emphasized an immediate focus on the United States and its NATO allies supplying Kiev with desperately needed Patriot air defense systems and ammunition as a counter to Russia’s constant missile and drone attacks, noting that allies who have placed their own orders for the U.S. system will have to wait in line behind Ukraine.
“We have acquired commitment from five countries so far for Patriot batteries and other air defense systems [for Ukraine] — as well as we’ve let it be known for those countries that are expecting, from us, air defense systems in the future, that they’re going to have to wait,” Biden said in Italy. “Everything we have is going to go to Ukraine until their needs are met. And then we will make good on the commitments we made to other countries.”
Biden signed the pledge of support for Ukraine as a signal of long-term U.S. commitment, especially after the U.S. Congress delayed desperately needed military aid for many months before passing it last April, a lull that Russian forces took advantage of by going on the offensive in Ukraine. The pledge amounts only to an “executive agreement” between leaders, however, falling far short of a treaty commitment that would need to be ratified by Congress. That means it would not be binding on former President Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, should he win reelection. Trump has promised only to negotiate a quick end to the Russia-Ukraine war, without specifying on what terms.
Regardless, the G-7 Summit was a welcome rallying point for continued support for Ukraine among Western leaders. In Italy, Biden also announced new sanctions on Moscow, for instance, targeting 300 additional individuals as well as foreign financial institutions that are enabling Russia’s war effort. In a major development, G-7 leaders also agreed after lengthy negotiations to loan Ukraine $50 billion to help it buy additional weapons and rebuild infrastructure damaged by Russian strikes. In an unmistakable signal to Moscow and President Vladimir Putin, the money will be repaid using interest on $300 billion in frozen Russian assets languishing mostly in European banks.
A clearly pleased Zelensky characterized agreements reached during the G-7 Summit as “truly historic,” and stated his belief that they will serve as a bridge to Ukraine’s future membership in the NATO alliance. “It is important for all Ukrainians, and for all Europeans, to know that there will be no security deficit in Europe, which tempts the aggressor to war, and makes the future uncertain,” he said.
James Kitfield is a Senior Fellow at CSPC
PBS and Unite America on Countering Extreme Partisanship with Electoral Reforms
On the show “America at a Crossroads,” Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) Senior Correspondent Judy Woodruff recently explored how electoral reforms like nonpartisan primaries can counter the extreme partisanship that has led to increased gridlock and dysfunction in Washington, D.C. Woodruff interviews Unite America’s Executive Director Nick Troiano, and their discussion highlights Alaska’s first “top-four nonpartisan primary” and “instant runoff” general election, emphasizing its role in enhancing representation and governance. This reform is specifically designed to promote political moderation, and it is also being seriously considered by voters in Nevada and Oregon.
You can watch the PBS show and gain further insights into how Unite America is helping to not only use nonpartisan primaries to transform Alaskan politics, but also reshaping the political landscape nationwide, at the below links:
Western Sanctions vs Russian Hard Power
By Ethan Brown
Economic sanctions are a poorly understood tool of national power in today’s complex geopolitical environment. The United States has a lengthy track-record of applying economic pressures to achieve fundamental strategic objectives, and not all of them (read: most) are seldom as effective as intended.
In the news this week is the pronouncement following the Group of Seven (G7) Summit in Italy that the United States is unleashing sweeping new economic sanctions, targeting the increased relationship and exchange of goods between Russia and China, particularly pressuring the technological exchange between Beijing and Moscow. While China has adhered to President Biden’s stark warning about sending weapons of any sort to aid Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine, U.S. officials have asserted that the increase in production of microchips, machined-tools, and components of potential weapons (such as drones) have been reported.
So here we see leading states in the Liberalist order reverting back to familiar territory: applying economic sanctions in an attempt to coerce or compel non-liberal actors to adapt behavior. And the unfortunate reality is that, in lieu of hard power, sanctions have proven to not be effective in altering the political behavior or conduct of an aggressor. Therein lies the fallacy of dependence on economic sanctions.
First, let’s examine the theory of sanctions (and I’m pulling some stuffy academic scholarship on the issue… my graduate professors would be proud). The definition of economic statecraft is “the use of economic tools to pursue foreign policy goals,” according to Theodore Cohn, author of “Global Political Economy” and leading thinker on the international economic system. Tools within that statecraft bucket include tariffs, sanctions, trade agreements, lending, and assistance (in the form of both financial, technological, and security assistance). Hard power, conversely, resides in warmaking material–aircraft, ships, artillery, personnel with guns and ammo, and the ability to forward stage that combined force to locations where deterrence or deliberate action is necessary.
But where states within the liberal system misunderstand the efficacy of using sanctions–and this applies across our domestic political spectrum, democrat and republican–is that in a liberal system, the economy and politics are considered to be separate, autonomous spheres of power and action. Thus, it is assumed that pressure in one consequently forces an adaptation in the other, and vice-versa. When we examine realist actors, economies and politics are synonymous, often reflecting state-controlled economies (such as China’s overt and implicit state-control of industries). Economic actions taken against realist actors are perceived as predictable and thus, such nations often conduct undesirable actions assuming they will face sanctions, meaning they are indifferent or willing to endure those possible outcomes.
Slowly returning to the thesis: the West’s response to the invasion of Ukraine over two years ago were unprecedented and sweeping sanctions, export restrictions, and asset seizure against Russia’s elite and state enterprises at a scale heretofore unseen in global political economies. There were in fact so many economic actions taken that the Congressional Research Service (CRS) had to write a standalone report just to outline the dozens of CRS reports covering the sheer volume of activities taken by the U.S. Treasury. In short, it was a lot. There were deliberate actions taken to isolate Russia from the international encrypted financial messaging system–better known as SWIFT (although most people had never heard of this everyday platform until February 2022)–and the targeting of Russian individuals, the seizure and freezing of their assets, and various other actions were profound. And just a month ago, the U.S. Treasury announced an additional 300 economic targets for American sanctions, these targeting industries related to defense procurement and tech development. The economic sanction outcome from this week’s G7 summit purports to include the U.S. State Department sanctions on energy, metals, and mining industries in addition to once again targeting Russian defense industrial base networks.
And yet, as I covered in this space less than a month ago, the Russian defense industrial base shows all signs of bouncing back from two years worth of economic pressure, and is behind the recent Russian counteroffensive which put Ukrainian defenders on the back foot. First, that defense industrial base managed to skate through economic pressures as Russia was mostly utilizing old (in many cases, geriatric Soviet) systems in its attempt to win with sheer numbers in the war’s early phases; that China, Iran, and North Korea were providing various forms of support and material in lieu of Western sanctions also meant that the Russian defense industry hadn’t necessarily needed to crank out new tanks and trucks. But now, it can.
So seemingly inevitably, the West looks to apply more of the same. It is indisputable that economic sanctions have had an impact on Russian society, just not the forecasted apocalyptic collapse envisioned when the first of over 11,000 sanctions were applied years ago. Now, the question of whether these new, “crippling” sanctions will have greater effect on Russia’s calculus with Ukrainian defenders being authorized, and in some cases, encouraged at the highest levels to start striking battlefield targets inside of Russia, remains to be seen.
But in closing, the eerily accurate and haunting words from economist Jon Kishner in 1997 still ring true today: “the greatest challenge to sanctions often comes not from the failure of such measures to have an economic effect, but from the failure of the economic effects to translate into the desired political outcome.”
Ethan Brown is a Senior Fellow at CSPC
The Terminal Decline of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party
By Hidetoshi Azuma
As the Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida attends the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Apulia, Italy this week, he will be heading home shortly with unmistakable ambivalence about his fate in Tokyo. Indeed, Kishida virtually enjoys an unrivaled status inside and outside the LDP as of this writing in June 2024 largely thanks to the absence of peer contenders and is inexorable in his rise to the second term as the premier following the upcoming LDP presidential election in September. Meanwhile, he is also one of the least popular prime ministers since 1945 and has been consistently renewing historic lows in support rate virtually every passing week. In other words, he derives his power largely from the LDP’s internal dynamics and Washington’s trust in him rather than popular support unlike his populist predecessor, Shinzo Abe. The paradox of Kishida’s power is a symptom of the long-term decline of the LDP, especially in the aftermath of Abe’s untimely demise in 2022. In fact, Japan’s ruling conservative party is already in terminal decline, and its uncertain future merits a sober reflection on its historical devolution, especially under the incumbent Japanese prime minister.
The founding of the LDP itself was a contradiction which continues to this day to overshadow the party’s future. The LDP emerged in 1955 at the height of the US-Soviet rivalry during the early days of the Cold War. Indeed, the historic merger of Japan’s two leading conservative parties at the time, the Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party, occurred in response to the growing consolidation of the Socialist Party, which had previously produced an administration under former prime minister Tetsu Katayama in 1947. Japan was no stranger to Cold War influence operations, and the rise of Socialist Party was inextricable from Moscow’s creeping sway over the defeated country rife with domestic tumult stemming from widespread poverty. Washington responded by providing covert support for the formation of the LDP mostly involving slush funds deriving from Imperial Japanese Army’s war booty, and such US support continued in various forms for decades thereafter during the Cold War. The upshot was the LDP’s peculiar internal factional dynamics driven largely by those leveraging the American aid, especially control over slush funds, for their own gains rather than the greater good of Japan. In other words, the LDP’s original sin was its willingness to exploit even the most undemocratic means to justify a perceived democratic end.
The LDP’s unique origin led to the rise of major factions led by charismatic leaders astute in managing the intra-party dynamics in addition to courting US support. Indeed, former prime minister Nobusuke Kishi epitomized such a leader. Having served in the wartime government in Tokyo, Kishi was once a Class A war criminal suspect who struck a deal with the US for his release and subsequent cooperation while awaiting a war crimes trial. Kishi was a fierce nationalist and anti-communist and went on to wield enormous influence within the LDP as its first Secretary-General, the party’s second highest-ranking post responsible for intra-party management as well as election strategy. He also entered into a Faustian pact with the Korean Christian cult, the Unification Church, to enlist its support for the LDP with manpower and finance. As a result, Kishi rose from a would-be war criminal to a Japanese prime minister boasting his own robust faction and enjoying special US support. Kishi thus provided the LDP with a formula for success, which singularly focused on the party’s monopolistic hold on power above all else. The so-called “1955 System,” or the LDP’s de facto single-party rule was arguably his most prominent achievement and was perfectly in line with Washington’s policy of transforming Japan into a bulwark against communism.
However, Kishi’s formula for the LDP was by no means free from defects, and various issues soon manifested themselves only to undermine the party’s future. First, the monopolistic concentration of power in the hands of the LDP gradually led the party to lose its policy discipline. For example, former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, who was arguably postwar Japan’s most charismatic leader, wielded unrivaled influence backed by his own faction and enormous political funds, allowing him to increasingly pursue policy adventurism. Indeed, he sought to redistribute wealth away from Tokyo toward Japan’s countryside by pouring subsidies into local governments while achieving double rapprochement with the Soviet Union and China, laying the foundation for Japan’s economic relations with the world’s leading communist powers. The upshot was the rise of big government politics pouring money at home and abroad with short-term gains often at the expense of Japan’s own national security imperatives. Tanaka’s unscrupulous approach to politics increasingly invited Washington’s consternations and later even its ire, which reportedly overshadowed the Japanese leader’s resignation after a series of major financial scandals, including the Lockheed scandal in the 1970s.
Second, the flip side of the coin of the LDP’s factional dynamics was that weak leadership would almost invariably become the norm absent charismatic leaders capable of achieving a delicate balance of power within the party. This was particularly evident following the departure of former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1987 after his five years of uncontested rule. Unlike Nakasone, who leveraged his factional leadership to pull off a series of major domestic reforms and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, his successors were of no comparable stature and even allowed political inertia to further undermine the LDP’s clout even to the point of yielding its ruling status in 1993 for the first time since 1955. By then, Washington’s covert support for the LDP had all but ceased largely due to the end of the Cold War. Therefore, the LDP’s influence further declined following the fall of the “1955 System” in 1993 and accelerated after Tokyo introduced single member districts in the 1994 election law reform. In fact, the 1994 reform even undermined the power of factions itself, leading them to splinter into numerous subgroups. This forced many candidates to court special interests instead of factional support for ballots and campaign funds.
The upshot was the paradoxical emergence of growing internal fragmentation of the LDP and centralization of power in the hands of the party’s top echelons controlling election strategy. Such was a recipe for the rise of artificial populism. Indeed, the 2001 election of Juinchiro Koizumi epitomized Japan’s new political landscape, leading populism to increasingly eclipse factional dynamics to shape policy. His resounding success was due to his ability to manufacture a populist movement ironically serving the establishment interests by leveraging modern public relations techniques for maximum theatrical effects. As a result, the Koizumi administration was essentially a motley crew of colorful politicians from across the spectrum of political persuasion because they all represented the establishment interests without losing populist appeal. Under his charismatic leadership, Koizumi heralded in the new era of the so-called “Kantei First” politics, signifying the growing concentration of power in the Prime Minister’s Office and the beginning of the long-term decline of the bureaucracy, which played an indispensable role in guiding politicians in implementing Japan’s postwar reconstruction and subsequent economic miracle. In other words, he turned Japanese politics upside down with far reaching consequences for its future.
While Koizumi’s departure led to the loss of political momentum for the LDP and even its humiliating three-year hiatus as the Opposition between 2009 and 2012, his populist legacy had become the norm when Abe began his second and longest term as the first leader since the LDP’s return to the ruling status. Indeed, Abe steered the LDP‘s ideological orientation increasingly toward his brand of populist nationalism and expanded the scope of Koizumie’s “Kantei First” politics under his signature, yet vague slogans of “Take Back Japan” and “Beautiful Nation.” Due to the widespread dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party’s rule, Abe virtually enjoyed carte blanche during the earlier days of his tenure and implemented a range of audacious policies from Abenomics to peace talks with Russia. The problem with Abe’s ambitious policies was that he allowed nepotism to drive them, leading to the further erosion of the LDP’s policy discipline. Indeed, he pursued his controversial agenda of signing a peace treaty with the Russian president Vladimir Putin by forming a pro-Russian faction within his administration and even courting the private sector to join the bandwagon. As a result, Washington repeatedly expressed displeasure at Abe’s questionable overtures to the Kremlin, but the Japanese leader stayed the course only to return empty-handed in the end. His nepotism was palpable in his other controversial connections ranging from the Tokyo Olympics Organizing Committee to even the Unification Church, which provided various support in propping up his populist nationalism. Abe’s growing graft ultimately led the Public Prosecutors Office to zero in on the then-incumbent prime minister, effectively ending his unprecedented political longevity by August 2020. In short, Abe’s downfall essentially exposed to the general public that his own brand of populist nationalism had degenerated into oligarchic nepotism, eroding the very foundation of the LDP’s populist politics.
Abe’s resignation in 2020 and his assasination in 2022 were the telltale signs that the LDP’s brand of populism had reached its inevitable limits. Indeed, it originally emerged as an artificial construct designed to ensure the LDP’s continuous hold on power absent the”1955 System” shaped by Washington’s Cold War imperatives for Japan. It merely thrived largely thanks to the perennially-weak Opposition, which continues to this day to remain preoccupied with seizing power instead of serving the general public. In other words, neither the LDP nor the Opposition has the popular mandate, but the entrenched political structure inherited from the Cold War days allows the ruling conservative party to remain at Tokyo’s helm virtually unchallenged precisely due to the lack of credible alternatives. Therefore, Abe’s immediate successor, former prime minister Yoshihide Suga, was unpopular and barely lasted for a year largely because his bland personality was no match for his predecessor’s charisma. Even if Suga had exuded charisma or benevolence, he would have likely suffered the same fate because the LDP’s artificial populism no longer appealed to the increasingly awakened public following almost a decade of Abe’s unbridled nepotism masquerading as populist nationalism.
Kishida thus emerged against the backdrop of the LDP’s historical devolution. He is neither a populist nor a leader and is merely a party apparatchik skilled at managing a small cadre of his allies for his own survival. Indeed, his sudden rise to premiership was a product of uneasy compromise among the LDP’s kingmakers, including Abe and and the former prime minister Taro Aso. Meanwhile, factions under Kishida were no longer as powerful as in the past, and his anachronistic, faction-driven approach to politics negatively impinged upon his administration’s longevity before their sudden dissolution in early 2024. As the head of the mainstream conservative faction, the Kochikai, Kishida sought a delicate intra-party balance of power with its neoconservative rival, the Seiwakai, which had reigned virtually unopposed since the rise of populism in the early 2000s. Kishida’s ultimate aim was to gradually undermine the Seiwakai’s clout to usher in a golden age of his own faction and allies. In fact, Abe’s demise and the subsequent political fallout stemming from the revelation of the LDP’s longstanding ties to the Unification Church provided Kishida with an unexpected opportunity to bolster his administration and reform the party by replacing those from his rival faction, the Seiwakai, and its affiliates with his own allies from the Kochikai. While his August 2022 cabinet reshuffle reflected such thinking to a degree, the Japanese leader essentially allowed himself to become embroiled in the Unification Church-related scandals by seeking to restore a factional balance of power rather than demonstrating leadership. Kishida’s failing became especially palpable as he found himself increasingly under fire due to the ever-accumulating list of sudden resignations of his own ministers one after another.
The upshot is the emergence of new internal dynamics in which the prime minister himself is not necessarily in control, allowing various competing elements to vie for power under the guidance of powerful kingmakers, including Kishida’s patron, the former prime minister Taro Aso. For example, the former Minister in Charge of Economic Revitalization Daishiro Yamagiwa found himself mired in an embarrassing scandal related to the Unification Church and resigned in October 2022. He then miraculously became the LDP’s top officer in charge of COVID-19 policy without delay. The significance of his transfer to the new post was that it occurred under the guidance of a handful of ministers allied with certain kingmakers without consultation with the prime minister. In other words, an internal coup against Kishida was slowly brewing and could easily manifest itself as soon as his popularity reaches another historic low. Equally significant is the very structure of the internal coup. The mutually-beneficial relationship between kingmakers and current ministers evokes ugly memories of the Imperial Japanese Army’s sinister usurpation of party politics from the 1930s driven by retired generals in collusion with active-duty junior officers who executed internal coups. While comparing the LDP with the Imperial Japanese Army may strike as unfair, both organizations share eerily similar group dynamics with catastrophic implications for the future of domestic Japanese politics. Ironically, the demise of the LDP factions beginning in January 2024 on Kishida’s watch only augmented the growing power of kingmakers.
This does not mean the immediate end of the LDP yet, but the twilight of it. At least until the end of this decade, the LDP will likely reign as Japan’s ruling party ironically because of the absence of credible Opposition. Yet, a leaderless organization bent on internecine fratricides remains doomed as the Imperial Japanese Army’s cataclysmic experience aptly demonstrates. The uncomfortable truth is that virtually no one in the LDP can pull off a course correction because of its own structural impediments barring fundamental reforms. Indeed, the noble intentions behind the 1994 electoral reform has so far failed to achieve the desired effect of resolving the LDP’s enduring internal problems dominated by factionalism and moneyed interests and instead spawned artificial populism serving the establishment interests for short-term gains. Abe’s assasination in July 2022 has essentially opened the Pandora’s Box of unchecked populism now turning against its own creator, evoking the unpleasant memories of many similar precedents from the 1920s and 30s. Worse, the LDP factions are now effectively out of commission due to the ongoing political funds scandal. In other words, the LDP has lost many of its historical functions designed to support its monopolistic hold on power. Looking beyond the 2020s, the LDP increasingly finds itself entering an uncertain, bleak future.
After all, the LDP originally emerged as Washington’s Cold War political expedient designed to advance the US regional policy of countering the threat of communism. Its initial Cold War-era raison d’etre is long obsolete, and fundamental internal rejuvenation is hardly expected. The LDP is therefore in a terminal condition suffering from the incurable organizational necrosis left behind by generations of its leaders. In this context, Kishida finds himself hopelessly on the short end of the stick and having to yield his leadership to those vying for power just to court their support in maintaining his own post. The silver lining is that as long as the LDP remains the ruling party, Japan will continue to receive the blessings from Washington, which in turn would prop up the declining ruling party. Indeed, no credible Opposition will likely emerge at least during this decade. Moreover, Kishida may as well win his reelection in the upcoming LDP presidential election in September thanks to the lack of superior alternatives. Meanwhile, the growing political crisis overshadowing the incumbent Japanese prime minister is an ill omen portending the twilight of the LDP itself. Common sense is often the least effective guide for history. Postwar Japan’s very premise of the LDP’s eternal rule is now increasingly in question and may even unravel in unexpected ways reminiscent of the demise of party politics in 1932 eclipsed by militarism. As the US inexorably plunges into the abyss of social divisions, including even the possibility of another civil war, it finds itself doubly troubled by the growing political crisis overshadowing America’s most important ally in its coming showdown with China.
Hidetoshi Azuma is a Senior Fellow at CSPC
NEWS YOU MAY HAVE MISSED
Microsoft and Google Countering Cyberattacks on Hospitals
By Daphne Nwobike
Waves of cybersecurity attacks have targeted various unsuspecting hospitals across America, especially those in rural areas. With cases of ransomware attacks spiking in 2023, and 249 of the complaints arising from the healthcare sector, the White House is eager to find solutions to a threat that can paralyze hospitals and put patients at risk of having their critical information stolen by Russian hackers. Ransomware attacks can also prevent nurses from accessing electronic health records and disrupt insurance billing, to name a few of the debilitating effects. With many rural hospitals already understaffed and underfunded, they often lack the resources to adequately protect their IT systems.
In response to this growing threat, Microsoft and Google have offered discounted services to rural healthcare providers to decrease their vulnerability to cyberattacks. Microsoft has committed to providing grants to hospitals, a 75 percent discount on security products for small organizations, and free cybersecurity assessments. Google has likewise pledged to “provide endpoint security advice to rural hospitals and non-profit organizations at no cost.” With the security of U.S. healthcare facilities and systems under threat, public, private and governmental actors must work together to stop breaches before they occur.
Biden Shines Spotlight on Juneteenth and African American History
By Daphne Nwobike
During a live-streamed event held at the White House on June 10th, the Biden administration emphasized its commitment to highlighting Black history and the experiences and achievements of Black Americans. From civil rights leaders to award-winning artists, notable members of the Black community were present at this commemoration of Juneteenth.
In his remarks, President Joe Biden emphasized the importance of increasing accessibility to African American history and culture through partnerships with the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), and the Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS). For example, the NEH plans to fund films, documentaries, lectures and reading and discussion programs to promote the importance and understanding of Juneteenth in anticipation of its 160th anniversary in 2025. The NEA also plans to award 100 grants to support local art organizations dedicated to bringing the arts to communities that typically lack access. By working with other organizations such as the National Park Service (NPS) and the Department of Interior (DOI), the Biden administration plans to invest in local institutions dedicated to preserving monuments, landmarks and other sites important to African-American history
Daphne Nwobike is a CSPC Intern
