Friday News Roundup — March 17, 2023
Happy St. Patrick’s Day from all of us at CSPC. While today is about wearing green, both the markets and policymakers are seeing red after the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and concerns of wider weakness in the banking system. While lawmakers seemed largely supportive of efforts to backstop the system, it remains to be seen whether the political blame will land on SVB, the Fed, previous banking deregulation, or some combination of all of the above.
Around the world, protests in France expanded as President Macron forced controversial pension reforms through using a measure that bypassed a parliamentary vote. In Israel, the prospect of unrest continues to grow, as the Netanyahu-led government continues to push ahead with judicial reforms. In China, the CCP announced a range of re-organization measures designed to further cement party control in the private sector, technology industry, and the management of Hong Kong and Macau.
This week, CSPC is pleased to release our latest Geotech report. In this edition, we cover the growing tension between the U.S. and China; the implementation of the CHIPS Act and IRA; shifting prospects for U.S. trade diplomacy; and the prospects of expanded export controls.
This week, in Foreign Affairs, CSPC Chairman Ambassador Tom Pickering shared thoughts on how we can think ahead for peace talks for the Ukraine War. Laying out a path for negotiations, dialogue, and potential referendum, he proposes a diplomatic pathway — even if much remains to be determined on the battlefield.
This week Joshua C. Huminski, the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs reviewed Martin Wolf’s “The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism” for the Diplomatic Courier. Seeking to answer the question of what ails liberal democracy, the FT’s Wolf sees the answer in economic factors such as rising inequality, rentier capitalism, and more. While an interesting and compelling argument, it is, according to Huminski, ultimately insufficient alone to capture the democratic erosion experienced in the non-English-speaking world.
In this week’s roundup, Joshua covers the latest on the AUKUS deal. Ethan Brown looks at the Congressional investigation into the 2021 collapse in Afghanistan. Robert Gerber gives us the run down on the U.S. diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific, and Hidetoshi Azuma updates us on the historic dialogue between Japanese and South Korean leaders. We wrap with some news you may have missed.
AUKUS, Submarines, and Strategic Competition
Joshua C. Huminski
This week, the details of the AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States were unveiled in San Diego, California. Joined by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak of the United Kingdom and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, President Joe Biden announced that the three countries would cooperate on an expansive submarine construction program that would ultimately see Australia possess nuclear-powered (though not nuclear-armed) submarines.
Under the accord, Australian and the UK would jointly cooperate on joint design of a submarine for Australia (incorporating advanced U.S. technology) that would likely see deployment in 2040. In the interim, the United States would begin rotating at least four Virginia-class submarines (America’s most advanced attack submarine) as early as 2027. The United Kingdom is also expected to deploy at least one of its Astute-class submarines as part of the rotation. In the early-2030s Australia is expected to purchase three to five Virginia-class submarines from the United States to serve as a stop-gap as its existing Collins-class submarines become obsolete before the new (tentatively called) SSN-AUKUS submarines arrive.
The agreement is about much more than just submarines. It is, in fact, about greater cooperation between and amongst the Anglosphere of countries, a point well-noted by the Financial Times’ Gideon Rachman who wrote: “Aukus is not a grand philosophical statement like the Atlantic Charter,” but “the nations of the “Anglosphere” are renewing their alliance — this time to counter China’s efforts to gain naval dominance in the Pacific.” Indeed, at a macro-political level, this is a demonstrative signal of the cooperation of three members of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing group (the other two being Canada and New Zealand) in the Indo-Pacific.
As the Economist’s Shashank Joshi wrote, the alliance hopes that by deepening cooperation on key technologies, an element of the AUKUS accord, “America and its allies can compete more effectively and close” the gap with China on key technologies such as AI and quantum computing. Underpinning this cooperation is a deep integration and quite new level of information-sharing between Canberra, London, and Washington. Indeed, in the case of the latter, this is prompting some consternation amongst security officials that opening America’s nuclear submarine technology risks further exposure and vulnerabilities. Moreover, the current information-sharing rules and regulations prohibit such transfers and will necessitate a revision to the books.
The agreement does have its detractors. There are concerns that the sharing of information on nuclear technology could presage a renewed cycle of proliferation and undermine existing non-proliferation accords. There are also unanswered questions about Australia’s ability to finance the significant expense of acquiring and operating the nuclear submarines — anticipated to cost upwards of $255 billion through 2055 — and America’s ability to support the construction of additional submarines at a time when its own naval industrial capacity is limited. The wisdom of America selling its Virginia-class submarines to Australia as it is going to need additional submarine capacity is also unclear. The agreement could help spur discussions within the United States about increasing shipbuilding capacity or finding alternative models of construction, such as shared manufacturing. Should this joint procurement prove successful, it could serve as a model for future endeavors, but there is no shortage of hurdles well before that decision point.
China, for its part and unsurprisingly, has reacted negatively to the announcement. China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, said that the allies were “walking further and further down the path of error and danger”. He added that AUKUS will “stimulate an arms race, undermine the international nuclear non-proliferation system and damage regional peace and stability.” Of course, Beijing would say that wouldn’t they? China’s objections are not unexpected and will not affect the plans of AUKUS. The planned deployment, sale, and development of submarines will not materially or appreciably change the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. It’s power and efficacy is far more in what it says about the alliance of the three countries, the shared commitment to confront Chinese expansionist ambitions, and to deepen a critical anchor in the international order.
Afghan Scars and Lessons
Ethan Brown
Last week, GOP leaders formally began the investigation into 2021’s fateful and chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. That mission — which successfully evacuated over 70,000 Afghans who qualified for immigration in exchange for services rendered during America’s longest war — was generally a success. But the heart-wrenching testimony from veterans who were part of those dark final weeks has struck the halls of the GOP-led lower congress amidst this inquiry into the mistakes and failures of the last days in Afghanistan.
First, some hard and difficult realities: this investigation has already been marred by partisanism, much of it emanating from the Republican side of the house, who retook the majority in the midterms last year. The inquiry into logistical, transportation, sequencing, vetting and communication problems that plagued the chaotic withdrawal has been a priority issue for House Republicans since the dust started settling in Kabul. But efforts to secure unredacted documents involving the decision-making and policy guidance, notably from the State Department, were largely unfulfilled by the department to the ire of the House investigation committee. This kind of infighting between federal bodies encapsulates what we already know: that an entirely human and tragic issue like the withdrawal from Afghanistan is not safe from party bickering.
Further, there were absolutely some terrible choices made, irrevocable damage done to American reputation and constancy abroad, and the hard reality that the Afghanistan war simply became untenable, and credit should go to both former President Trump for initiating the withdrawal, and President Biden for seeing it through, this kind of residual blowback was inevitable. But that doesn’t make it any easier for Americans who are watching the political theater of this investigation unfold, especially not when reviewing the testimony of multiple veterans who were present (including some who survived the suicide attack on August 26, 2021, which killed 13 American servicemembers, wounding dozens more including at least 170 Afghan civilians) in those last days.
Serving as a key point in the investigation’s opening inquiries was an exploration as to why the Afghan security forces fell so quickly to the Taliban onslaught, as well as the selection and vetting process for which Afghans were evacuated while hundreds of thousands more were left behind. Those left behind included many thousands who were eligible to immigrate to the United States, and whose status remaining behind under Taliban rule is a guaranteed risk to their safety. The short answer to the first of those questions is already known, unfortunately. The National Defense Forces of the Afghan state fell — in most cases without firing a shot — because we had built a coverage architecture with weapons, sensors and intelligence which the Afghan military became entirely dependent on. When our withdrawal was set in stone, and the horde of Taliban insurgents converged on Kabul, there shouldn’t have been any surprises that the ANDSF would fail to turn it back.
For the latter, why so many Afghans were left behind: there may never be any good or satisfactory answers. Nothing that will explain or justify the price paid by 13 American personnel on the day of the suicide attack. Nothing that will comfort those Afghans who remain under the repression of a Taliban regime who is rapidly driving the state into yet another humanitarian crisis.
The testimonies of those who were on a security checkpoint were difficult to review, as they explained the chaos as it unfolded during those final weeks. Some of the recounts included summaries of Taliban brutality as the insurgents retook the capital city, surrounding American forces at the final bastion of Hamid Karzai International Airport. In those extremely dark moments, gunshots were regularly heard by American military personnel — often the Taliban shooting into the night sky for crowd control, but more often than not, executing helpless Afghans. In two separate accounts I compiled for a contemporary history of the War on Terror, I spoke with two Forward Air Controllers who were managing the aircraft over Kabul in the final days. They recounted the same thing: wanton killings, executions, Taliban members beating crowds with chains as whips. This was the ruthless barbarism that American and coalition partners spent twenty years of blood and treasure in the graveyard.
What are the lessons to learn as House committees pick at the newly-formed, and for countless veterans and their families, as-of-yet-undeveloped scars our society bears after twenty years in Afghanistan?
First: we failed policy in Afghanistan and Iraq. We failed policy and grand cohesive strategy in the War on Terror. The military cannot achieve political outcomes for its elected leaders if it has no end state to operationalize for. The defense enterprise does not build nations. It does not craft societies in our image. It does not export our democracy in ways that our Western mindset believes. Our military might deters aggression, and if it fails to do so, fights battles to defeat aggression. The military was improperly relied upon for too many things with far too little vectoring from the elected leaders who dictate its use.
Second: American self-perception is bloodied and aching, and this renewed interest in the darkest nights of the failed incursion into Afghanistan and Iraq — or at least the failed sustainment of an errant war that was legitimate in the beginning — is only going to pour salt on our national wounds. But this is a necessary pain, and to make it worse we aren’t going to resolve those past mistakes no matter how rigorous the inquiry is or what answers it yields.
Third: and this may well be the only substantive outcome of the House Committees inquiry: there is nothing good to come of examining the minutiae of the departure. Its use and utilitarian value going forward should inform our policy crafters on the gravity of failing to make clear and achievable our goals abroad in our interests. Should anyone in congress use this trauma for political theater and more partisan squabbling, it will be for shame.
What the committee investigation is likely to learn from its investigation into the flawed withdrawal plan, hopefully, is that the strategic goals of the War on Terror were made impossible from an early stage. Those unclear objectives would compound over twenty years until the last few brave servicemen and women stood on the tarmac at HKIA, bundling the last few terrified Afghans onto cargo planes amidst nightmares and chaos, and praying they too would make it onto a plane bound for freedom and rule of law.
Twenty years of policy failures led to the traumatic withdrawal from Afghanistan. Our only lesson to discover from this investigation is that we must avoid unclear goals in future engagements, or we will suffer these lessons once more.
U.S. Beefs Up Its Diplomatic Presence in the Gulf, Indo-Pacific
Robert W. Gerber
The Gulf is a notoriously challenging place for U.S. diplomacy: it is a region where U.S. security, economic, and human rights priorities converge, and where U.S. bilateral relationships are complex, to say the least. Unfortunately, the United States has had long term vacancies in our embassies in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait City, and this state of affairs is not conducive to the effective execution of foreign policy. This is because Senate-confirmed ambassadors have an advantage over caretaker Chargés d’Affaires: ambassadors have the American president’s ear; they tend to get higher level meetings with host governments; and they can corral disparate U.S. agency representatives at post — an essential task.
Recently, the U.S. Senate has taken steps to fill some of these critical posts. On March 16 the Senate confirmed career diplomat Michael Ratney as ambassador to Riyadh, and on March 14, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the nomination of U.S ambassadors to Kuwait, and UAE. The Committee also considered U.S. nominees to Maldives — an important relationship in the Indo-Pacific region — and Turkmenistan, which falls under the State Department’s Europe and Eurasia Bureau.
Each of the nominees is a well-qualified career member of the Foreign Service and they are expected to be confirmed. What was most interesting about the hearing was what it revealed about U.S. priorities in the region and where Senators see gaps in our foreign policy coverage. Senators Menendez, Hagerty, Kaine, Ricketts, Shaheen, and Murphy all made interventions at the hearing. Key takeaways:
- There was bipartisan alarm about aggressive activities of the Chinese Communist Party in the Gulf and the Indo-Pacific and consensus that the United States needs to be more present and more assertive in the two regions so China does not “fill the void.” In particular, Senators expressed worry that the relationship with the UAE is trending in the wrong direction, particularly over the open question of whether or not China is building a military base in the UAE. Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) asked Ambassador-nominee Strong if she saw China’s presence in the region as a threat to U.S. national security. Strong commented that countering the CCP was a top U.S. priority across the globe, that the United States had made its concerns known to the UAE government, and said the Committee would receive a briefing on the purported Chinese military base soon. Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-NJ) made the point that we should not tell governments that they need to choose between the U.S. and China. Instead, we should urge governments to decide what kind of a future they want for themselves — i.e., embracing open commerce and sovereignty in partnership with the United States, or subjugating themselves to the closed authoritarian CCP model.
- Senator Hagerty asked Strong if she agreed with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s comment that China’s brokering a de-escalation of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran was a good thing. Hagerty recently tweeted “Biden squandered the opportunity he inherited to strengthen America’s position in the Middle East. The recent China-brokered agreement between Iran & Saudi Arabia is a regrettable yet unsurprising consequence of the Biden Admin’s foreign policy malpractice.”
- Senators pointed out that the UAE has supplied military technology to Russia in spite of the U.S. sanctions regime. Pushing countries to join the Western-led sanctions regime and condemn Russia will be a difficult ongoing effort. UAE is a problem in this regard, much as it is for enforcement of international sanctions on Iran — a fair amount of gray market commerce with Iranian ports goes through Dubai — which lies just across the water.
- Senators from both parties acknowledged the high importance of the Indo-Pacific region. They welcomed the administration’s decision to increase U.S. presence in the region, as demonstrated by the new U.S. embassy in Maldives.
- Menedez expressed disappointment that Kuwait has not joined the Abraham Accords, which normalizes Arab government relationships with Israel. Ambassador-nominee Karen Sasahara said this would be one of her priorities if confirmed. “To not consider it can risk being an outlier in the region,” she commented.
- Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) engaged in a dialogue with Strong — who currently serves as Chargé in Riyadh — on the complexities of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Kaine said he was “still extremely angry” over the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there had not been accountability. He also acknowledged that the Saudis had given aid to Ukraine and had recently agreed to purchase billions in Boeing airliners.
Comment: The United States has only 28 vacant ambassador seats among 193 posts. This is good news for the execution of U.S. foreign policy and a big improvement over one year ago, when Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) had a hold on confirmations and the Biden administration had been slow to nominate ambassadors. If confirmed, the new nominees to the Middle East and Indo-Pacific have a difficult job ahead to deliver on the complex set of emerging issues and to meet the Committee’s high expectations. The shortage of reliable allies in the region makes this task even more challenging. The focus on China in the Gulf represents a paradigm shift — five years ago the top concern would have been Iran’s influence in the region. The hearing showcased broad bipartisan consensus on these issues, as well as on the importance of U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. But even with a robust presence in key capitals, and leveraging all diplomatic tools and a whole-of-government approach, there will be some events where U.S. influence will meet its limits. This will be hard to come to terms with. It demands an approach that expands the circle of like-minded allies and features honest and transparent communication between ambassadors and members of the SFRC.
The Historic Japan-South Korea Rapprochement
Hidetoshi Azuma
South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol visited Japan on March 16 for a historic summit with his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. The summit occurred for the first time in either country in 12 years, underscoring the troubled neighborly relationship between the two major US allies in the middle of the Indo-Pacific. In fact, the very fact that the two leaders shook hands earlier this week was tantamount to their respective diplomatic defeat for their domestic constituents and merely revealed the perennial factor of American power guiding them beyond history. Therefore, the real significance of the latest Japan-South Korea summit was that the bilateral relationship is slowly moving to the next phase of transformation in which the two US allies increasingly look to jointly play their roles in Washington’s evolving regional alliance architecture in the region.
The historical antagonism between Japan and South Korea is nothing new. The two countries have irreconcilable differences stemming from various historical factors ranging from their subordinate positions within the Sinocentric system to Korea’s colonial past under Imperial Japanese rule. The advent of American power after WWII drove them to restore diplomatic ties in 1965 but did not fundamentally resolve their deep-seated mutual mistrust. This led Japan and South Korea to remain hostile to each other without compromising their alliances with the US, but it perennially frustrated Washington’s vision for a regional trilateral alliance. Moreover, the weaponization of history by the two countries was in fact beneficial for both countries as the historical antagonism served as a pretext for pumping Japanese money into South Korea’s postwar economic reconstruction ultimately generating significant returns on investment for Japan’s business establishment.
Against this backdrop, the impossible happened when Yoon visited Tokyo to deliver an olive branch to Kishida earlier this week. Inevitably, their act of rapprochement invited a fierce backlash from their domestic constituents, who labeled the initiative as a diplomatic defeat for their respective countries. While vehement nationalism drives the mutual animosities, the main outcry emerged mostly from the radical elements in both countries historically positioned to profit from their weaponization of history. In other words, the majority of the public accepted their leaders’ overtures for mutual goodwill. After all, the prevailing historical narratives in the two countries have been marred by politics beyond recognition, leading many to realize the futility of focus on the past.
This was of course not possible without Washington’s guidance of Kishida and Yoon, but the significance is that they took extra pains to transcend domestic politics. To be sure, the growing silent majority in Japan and South Korea aided their efforts. Meanwhile, it is also true that the two leaders expanded the scope of their security cooperation toward a truly trilateral alliance. Indeed, their single most important accomplishment was the launch of the Japan-South Korea Economic Security Dialogue focused on supply chain security. This is an evolution of the newly-launched US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Economic Security Dialogue. While refraining from pointing their fingers to China, the obvious focus of their bilateral economic security efforts will be decoupling from their common neighbor. Kishida reciprocated Yoon’s overtures by removing South Korea off the so-called “white list” of banned countries for semiconductor trade.
A tectonic shift occurred in East Asian geopolitics this week as Kishida’s and Yoon finally shook their hands at least for now. To be sure, their act of rapprochement was unpopular, and a political time bomb is waiting to explode unless the growing silent majority stand up to the fringe opposition groups in each country. Yet, the handshake in Tokyo underscored the transcendental power of the US as well as the two countries’ willingness to defend the rules-based international order. The next trilateral imperative is to consolidate the fragile foundation carefully laid by the two leaders and elevate the new relationship above the domestic politics fueled by perennial historical animosities.
News You May Have Missed
Afghan Women Protested Outside Kabul Universities in Response to Ban on Female Education
The March 6 protest was against the Taliban government’s ban on female education. Women have not been allowed to attend university since last December. The government stated the ban was due to women not observing Islamic values such as dress rules and other factors. Women are not allowed to travel without a male guardian, while men and women interactions in school are also prohibited. A video surfaced around the web showing a group of girls sitting on the ground outside the university reading. Photos posted by the university showed men sitting in a classroom. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Higher Education announced that “all teachers and students attended their lessons in a safe and calm atmosphere.” The UN has said the aban on female education “may amount to gender persecution, a crime against humanity.”
U.S. Senate Calls on UN to Investigate Iranian Torture Centers
A CNN investigation in February 2023 found secret torture centers in Iran. In response to this news, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked the United Nations to investigate these centers. “The discovery of these secret jails is the latest example of the cruelty of the Iranian regime. The international community needs to hold Tehran accountable for torturing its citizens,” stated the Foreign Relations Committee on Twitter. CNN found more than three dozen clandestine jails that were undeclared or operated by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and used to detain and torture protestors. The UN Human Rights Council launched a separate investigation on the nationwide protests in September 2022. The protests erupted over the death of a 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian woman Mahsa Amini.
Turkiye moves to ratify Finland’s Nato bid while discussions with Sweden continue
On Friday March 17, Türkiye’s president Erdogan announced that the Turkish parliament will begin proceedings to ratify Finland’s bid to join NATO, with a view to ratifying before Turkish elections in May. Even though Finland and Sweden submitted their applications at the same time in May last year, it now seems Finland’s ratification will go forward first. Hungary, the other outstanding NATO member, said it intended to vote on Finland’s — and only Finland’s — bid on March 27. Türkiye plans to “continue discussions” with Sweden. Finland’s President Niinistö stated that Finland’s membership would not be “complete without Sweden” at a joint press conference with Erdogan.
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.
