Friday News Roundup — March 19, 2021
U.S.-China After Anchorage; Putin Takes Umbrage; Joint Planning in the Indo-Pacific
Good morning to you from Washington, D.C. Here inside the Beltway, it’s been a busy week. The Biden administration and Congressional Democrats have continued to tout the impact of the $1.9 trillion COVID relief plan, with President Biden deploying the catchphrase “shots in arms and money in pockets.” Cabinet nominations have continued, including the narrow 50–49 confirmation of Secretary of Health and Human Services Xavier Becerra and far more comfortable 98–0 and voice vote confirmations, respectively, of U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai and CIA Director William Burns. Congressional Republicans continue to press the administration on the growing crisis at the southern border, while procedural maneuvers in the House have served as a reminder of the minority’s power to slow things down. Perhaps, in a reminder of the Washington saying, “there are three parties: Democrats, Republicans, and Appropriators,” House Republicans joined their Democratic counterparts in approving a return to earmarking.
At CSPC, we also wanted to take this moment to reflect on growing anti-Asian American violence and rhetoric in the United States. The week’s tragic events in Georgia have focused attention on a growing problem. In our work focusing on competition with the regime of Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, it is important to remember that the Chinese people are the greatest victims of the CCP’s abuses and repression. In this competition, it is our diversity of backgrounds, ethnicities, creeds, and viewpoints that ultimately makes us strong — e pluribus unum.
This week at CSPC, we hosted events with Wes Morgan, author of The Hardest Place, who discussed his study of the Afghanistan War and his time in the Pech Valley and Josh Rogin, columnist and author of Chaos Under Heaven, a chronicle of U.S.-China relations during the Trump administration. These and our other events are available on demand on our YouTube channel. Joshua also reviewed Rogin’s in this week’s book review, highlighting the book’s detail of the Trump administration’s approach to China. Next Tuesday, we will be hosting Joby Warrick, author of Red Line, which chronicles the Syrian Civil War and U.S. and international efforts to destroy the Assad regime’s chemical weapons. On Wednesday, we will be hosting a discussion on lessons from New START and the road ahead for arms control with our Chairman Ambassador Tom Pickering and the Hon. Rose Gottemoeller, former NATO Deputy Secretary General and former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.
In this week’s roundup, Dan looks at the details of the U.S.-China Anchorage summit and some of the looming tradeoffs that the Biden administration will have to consider. Joshua looks at how Russia has responded after taking offense to President Biden’s interview with George Stephanopoulous, and Ethan covers the Indo-Pacific Joint Warfighting Concept. As always, we wrap with news you may have missed.
After Anchorage
Dan Mahaffee
Today and yesterday, the first high level meetings of U.S. and Chinese officials of the Biden presidency are taking place at the historic Hotel Captain Cook in Anchorage, Alaska. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan will lead a U.S. delegation meeting with a Chinese delegation led by Politburo member and chief diplomat Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Based on the tenor of the opening exchanges, perhaps the only middle ground between Washington and Beijing is Alaska itself.
As the Biden administration has continued many of the tough-on-China policies of the Trump administration, adding to it deeper engagement with allies and a greater emphasis on human rights, it is not clear whether Washington and Beijing even see eye-to-eye on the nature of these meetings. As reported by the team of Natasha Bertrand and Nahal Toosi at Politico, the U.S. team sees this as a one-off to address certain issues before strategic dialogue can resume, while the Chinese see this as an opportunity to resume strategic dialogues.
In briefing reporters before the meeting, Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tankai, stated, “when its core interests are involved, China has no room to back down.” Thus, while no one expected two three-hour sessions in Anchorage to provide a total reset to Sino-American relations, it is a marker for how the Biden administration will engage Beijing in what President Biden calls the “extreme competition” with China.
During this week’s CSPC event with author and columnist Josh Rogin about his book Chaos Under Heaven describing the Trump-Xi relationship, the clear contrast between the transactional approach of President Trump based on perceptions of a working relationship with President Xi, little interest in human rights, and a focus on trade and economic dealings (until the pandemic) with the more institutional and multilateral approach of the Biden team.
Already, we have seen greater engagement with allies. Secretary Blinken and his counterpart from across the Potomac Defense Secretary Austin traveled to Tokyo and Seoul, and the Biden administration has conducted dialogues with the leaders of Japan, India, and Australia — known as “the Quad” — with agreements reached, including one on a “Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group.” If how the Chinese respond to these efforts is a testament to their efficacy, then note Ambassador Cui’s further comments, “Some people may think that by talking to other countries before meeting with China, they can give out their voice and show their strength. This is unnecessary, and may not work…If you have issues to talk about with China, do it, face to face.”
Engagement with allies is a key part of any U.S. strategy for dealing with Beijing, but (re)engagement is the easy part. On one hand, as we’ve seen European allies have varying interests with China and may not share the same security concerns that Indo-Pacific allies do. At the same time, as we seek to build regional and global coalitions — what are the balances of shared values, human rights concerns, supply chain security, commercial interests, etc. that shape the participants’ partnership with Washington and resistance towards Beijing? How too will we address illiberal or sliding democracies, especially as Modi’s increasingly Hindutarian India looks less and less like a pluralistic democracy.
At home, there will also be challenges ahead. While the 100-day supply chain review is a start, what will we do with its findings or those of the even greater review to follow? The Commerce Department is moving ahead to block Chinese telecom companies from U.S. infrastructure, but that is just one aspect of securing our infrastructure and society from Chinese Communist Party influence and espionage. What too when politically-preferred and politically-influential industries are pulled into the fray? We saw this in the Trump administration as farmers and manufacturing were the focus, but what of the China interests of bluer-hued Wall Street, Hollywood, and Silicon Valley?
While unlikely to bring about a sea change in the path for U.S.-China relations, the Anchorage summit is still a reminder that engagement and dialogue are necessary, even with the scope and shape of Beijing’s behavior is clear. Looking past Anchorage, however, there are tough choices that remain — and many of them will require answers to hard questions here in Washington.
Russia Recalls its Ambassador
Joshua C. Huminski
In an unexpected development, Russia recalled its Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Antonov, for consultations. This follows the publication of an Intelligence Community report directly accusing President Vladimir Putin of ordered an interference campaign in the 2020 elections, and increasingly assertive rhetoric from President Joseph Biden. In an ABC news interview, the president said he believed that Putin was “a killer” and warned that “he will pay a price” for the country’s interference in America’s elections.
When asked about President Biden’s remarks, President Putin artfully dodged the question, saying “As for the statements of my American colleague. What would I answer him? I would say to him: ‘I wish you good health’.” He then turned to remarks about U.S. history and the treatment of Native Americans adding, “We always see our own traits in other people and think they are like how we really are. And as a result, we evaluate [a person’s] actions and give assessments.” In essence, President Putin was saying “it takes one to know one”.
President Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, was more direct, saying “These are very bad statements by the president of the United States,” adding “Such things have never happened in history.” He continued, “It’s clear that [Biden] does not want to normalise relations with our country. This is what we will be guided by from now on.”
Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for Russia’s foreign ministry did not directly link the comments to the recall, but said, “The Russian ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Antonov, has been invited to come to Moscow for consultations conducted with the aim of analyzing what should be done and where to go in the context of ties with the United States.” She noted that bilateral relations between Russia and the United States, “are in a difficult state, which Washington has brought to a dead end in recent years.” Ambassador Antonov was appointed in August 2017 and previously served as Russia’s deputy foreign minister responsible for military and political security.
Recalling an ambassador for “consultation” is a highly visible rebuke by Moscow of both Preisdent Biden’s comments and the Intelligence Community’s assessment. Previously, President Putin signaled that such a move would be rare, but not unthinkable. In an interview in March 2014, President Putin said that recalling an ambassador would be an “extreme” measure. He added, “If necessary, it will be used. But I really don’t want to use it.”
Indeed, the last time that Russia recalled its ambassador was in 1998, following President Clinton’s decision to launch airstrikes against Iraq. In 2018, as part of a joint U.S. and European response to the poisoning of Sergiei Skripal in Salisbury, England, 130 Russian diplomats were expelled and two facilities in the United States were shuttered.
The Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) found that “Russian President Putin authorized, and a range of Russian organizations, conducted influence operations aimed at denigrating President Biden’s candidacy and the Democratic Party…We have a high confidence in our assessment.” Other countries, including China, Iran, and others were also identified in the ICA as attempting to influence the 2020 election.
Unsurprisingly, Russia denied the accusations. In a post on Facebook, the Russian embassy in Washington said, “The document prepared by the U.S. intelligence community is another set of baseless accusations against our country for interfering in American domestic political processes.” The statement continued: “The conclusions of the report on Russia conducting influence operations in America are confirmed solely by the confidence of the intelligence services of their self-righteousness. No facts or specific evidence of such claims were provided.”
The United States recently sanctioned seven Russian officials for the poisoning and arrest of Alexei Navalny, a Russian dissident who was transferred to a penal colony this week, and added 14 entities linked to the production of chemical and biological weapons to a Commerce Department blacklist. The sanctions were also a first part of the U.S.’ response to the SolarWinds breach, believed to be conducted by Russia’s foreign intelligence — the SVR. The Biden administration signaled that it would respond at some point in the future using “a mix of actions”. Unidentified officials speculated that the likely response would be through covert cyber means (undermining the covert aspect of the response).
The recall of the Russian ambassador is the latest step in the gradual deterioration of relations between Washington and Moscow. This is not unique to President Biden, but certainly was underway under President Trump in substance, just not in public style. President Trump increased lethal aid to Ukraine, expanded sanctions on Russia, and at an operational level, certainly pushed back against Moscow’s ambitions. Yet, prior to the recall and the verbal fighting, the United States and Russia did agree to an extension of the New START treaty, so all is not lost in terms of the relationship.
This move by Moscow should not be entirely surprising. Russian diplomatic behavior is often characterized by over-the-top, hyperbolic responses to perceived slights and on encountering some resistance, but is typically followed by some measure of conciliation. Moscow may flip the table and walk away, but will return to the room with a cup of tea and act as if they are mollifying the situation.
Indeed, on Thursday, President Putin suggested that he and President Biden have an open, online, live conversation, saying “I want to invite President Biden to continue our discussion, but on condition that we do it actually live, as they say, online. Without any delay, but right in an open direct discussion. I think it would be interesting for the people too. Russia, and for the people of the United States, and for many other countries.”
While it is both unlikely that this is a genuine offer — President Putin prefers highly scripted engagements with pre-selected questions — and that President Biden would accept, it is reflective of this push-pull dynamic of Russian diplomatic behavior. It is equally likely a jab at President Biden’s unwillingness, thus far, to engage in an open question and answer press conference.
In some ways, being called a “killer” by President Biden may actually help President Putin. Part of his allure and his support is being seen as a decisive and strong nationalist leader, dispatching the enemies of Russia (well, his enemies at least). Being seen as an adversary of the United States, directly from the mouth of President Biden may reinforce this image, allowing him to point to Washington and say, in effect, “see, they are our adversary using such harsh language.”
The immediate challenge for the Biden administration is the articulation of a strategy towards Russia that leverages all of American power towards a defined end state. It is clear that the administration is keen to take a firmer line with Moscow, but firmness is not a strategy, merely an approach. Hitherto, this administration, and indeed previous administrations, have muddled through crisis after crisis, and lurched from situation to situation. Moreover, this strategy needs to recognize Russia’s strategic interests (understanding is not acceptance) and act accordingly. Assuming that President Putin is acting out of weakness or brittleness is to set up Washington for ultimate strategic failure.
INDOPACOMs All-Domain Strategy
Ethan Brown
As the DoD begins to adapt to the new confines of budgetary limits and returns to its slog through the fiscal year, this week offers us defense nerds a chance to unpack the proposed Indo-Pacific Commands warfighting strategy, a supplemental guidance to the Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC, a key cog in the All-Domain Operations doctrine of future conflicts). The proposed warfighting concept was initially intended to be presented to congressional and the defense secretary’s review process by December of last year, but of course, the pandemic has slid all deadlines to the right, giving us the opportunity now to dive into how the world’s most pivotal command intends to address the increasing security vulnerabilities presented by Chinese Communist aggression via the People’s Liberation Army in the Pacific.
Some brief backgrounders on the JWC, before tying INDOPACOMs priorities into the broader analysis. The JWC is built on four primary vectors of competition and conflict: long-range fires (joint, obviously), all-domain command and control (ditto joint, and a favorite coverage topic of my space here at the roundup), compromised logistics (bullets and beans in a denied environment), and the amorphous “information advantage”, which falls somewhere in the gamut of the advanced digital data-sharing (queue the JADC2) and adversary information denial, a decidedly challenging electronic warfare challenge.
The Joint Warfighting Concept is, at its most basic level, the methodology by which the DoD envisions how conflict might occur between combined arms forces in a rapidly escalating conflict, Taiwan, for example and topical relevance today. In that regional locale, long-range fires will be necessary to respond to the expanded deterrence zone seized by PLA maritime, ground, and missile defense forces following a seizure of the island; U.S. and coalition partners must employ those precision long-range weapons beyond the range of Chinese Communist systems like the HQ-9 and HQ-22, in order to set conditions for expulsion of aggressor forces. Joint command and control, of course, is the architecture used to maneuver ships, aircraft, space and ground forces under a unified command, giving the orders for execution and keeping all echelons informed of the fight. Logistics under attack is the methodology of keeping friendly and coalition forces supplied in a denied environment, delivering bullets and supplies to those forward forces within the bubble of adversary influence. Information advantage gets muddy, but for simplicity sake, it means continuing to employ those decentralized C2 principles when a peer adversary is making every effort to degrade our data sharing abilities across forces and echelons of command, while similarly causing such atrophy to enemy information systems.
The Indo-Pacific presents challenges quite unlike any other environment in which U.S. forces are currently engaged, due to the sheer expanse of the operational locales and the proximity of our key opponent in Chinese aggression. That the DoD enterprise is still finding its post-Afghanistan/GWOT feet is another dynamic that already puts the U.S. behind the eight-ball when strategizing for such a monstrous operational theater.
There is a great deal of give-and-take (especially with the budget-crunch lurking just over the calendars horizon) when INDOPACOM is looking at cracking this geographic and architectural nut. In the words of Adm. Philip Davidson (INDOPACOM Commander), the new concept isn’t trying to only defeat China in an all-out brawl (spoiler, that doesn’t go well as our colleague James Kitfield covered recently), but also aims to stave off that possibility by first denying the PLA easy targets that would set the stake for a hemispheric assault by the Chinese forces. “[Our Joint Force] must present an effective deterrent that holds an adversary — and all that adversary holds dear — at risk”.
This starts by Adm. Davidson’s request to get the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System online in Guam, part of INDOPACOMs five year, $27 Billion Pacific Deterrence Initiative covered under the standing DoD budget. The strategy continues by recommending the dispersal of troops across the domain, making our presence too diverse to yield a return on offensive investment by the adversary. Sun Tzu probably said something in his poorly-aged platitudes of warfighting about not consolidating ones forces as an easy target, and for U.S. forces needing to expand partnerships abroad in a changing security dynamic (here’s one means for doing that), making the price for engaging us too costly to stomach is but one small, critical step in deterrence. Part of that force dispersal and posturing for aggression response resides within the Navy’s plan to field a flotilla of “Light Amphibious Warships” capable of unilateral operations as a self-contained offensive juggernaut; as well as the USMC’s development of the Marine Littoral Regiment, good old fashioned shock troops who are trained to specifically eliminate PLA island expansions with speed, surprise, and violence of action.
Critical to this operational environment, and my little policy/strategy soap box, will be the broader DoD (and this case, the Navy under INDOPACOM) not only pursuing a JADC2 objective, but fully integrating into the advancing success of the Air Forces Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). Dr. George Ka’iliwai, INDOPACOMs director for requirements, has made it clear that the IPWC ties directly into the success in joint command and control that the Air Force has spearheaded for several years now, but how remains to be seen as the IPWC concurrence works through its paces. I’ve made plenty of arguments over the past year that ABMS and its joint C2 principles are going to be key in power competition (albeit in a post-counterterrorism era which warrants the DoD’s return to low-tech competence for these denied environments), especially when the Joint Force is facing the challenges of the Pacific theater.
Unfortunately, the ABMS project has already suffered from budgetary squeezes, being forced to cut one on-ramp this coming summer, meaning Pacific rim partners in Australia and surrounding won’t get a chance to integrate into the coalition development vectors yet, necessitating a realignment of resources in order to do more with less.
Rather than exacerbating the issue of fewer developmental resources at odds between Project Convergence (U.S. Army JADC2 offering), Project Overmatch (The Navy JADC2 program), and a now at-risk ABMS construct that remains at the desk of Joint Chiefs Chairman General Milley, INDOPACOM would be well-served in augmenting the success of ABMS in order to achieve its IPWC goals for deterrence in the Pacific. After all, Sun Tzu said “we cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors”. INDOPACOM faces a strategic challenge, now has designs on how to address the issues, and the friendly neighborhood Air Force has solutions to many of these particular challenges.
News You Might Have Missed
UN Visits Island of Relocated Rohingya Refugees
Sarah Naiman
This week, the UN dispatched a delegation to the Bangladeshi Bhasan Char island, where thousands of Rohingya Muslim refugees have been relocated. According to a UN spokesperson, “The visit will look at the current situation and facilities on Bhasan Char, appraise the needs of the Rohingya refugees relocated there, as well as discuss with the authorities and others currently working on Bhasan Char.” The island, located several hours from the nearest port, is a matter of great controversy, as some of its new inhabitants claim to have been forcefully relocated. Moreover, its Rohingya residents are not permitted to resettle elsewhere, despite the island’s known vulnerability for flooding. The settlement on Bhasan Char was intended to de-densify Bangladesh’s border camps, where over one million Rohingya refugees fleeing persecution in Myanmar now reside. The Bangladeshi government hopes to eventually transport an additional 97,000 refugees to Bhasan Char. It is unclear if and how the UN delegation’s trip will affect the future of these relocated Rohingya Muslims.
Leaked Report Questions Efficacy of U.S. Special Operations in Africa
A classified memo from 2018 leaked to VICE news detailed the efforts of the Pentagon and Special Operations Forces in Africa and documented the rise in extremism across the continent despite U.S. operations and assistance to partner nations. A particular area of concern has been the growth of ISIS-affiliated groups — including groups in Mozambique highlighted in this roundup. As terrorist groups proliferate in Africa, this leaked document will raise questions about whether military operations or other forms of assistance are the best answer for improving stability and combating terrorism.
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.
