Friday News Roundup — November 4, 2022
This week in Washington, President Biden delivered remarks that framed the stakes of the midterm election — which takes place next week — as a fight for democracy itself. This was President Biden’s second recent speech on the topic and it came in the wake of the violent assault suffered by Paul Pelosi, husband of Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. Republicans would prefer to talk about inflation, which has not abated. The Federal Reserve seems to agree that inflation remains a problem as it hiked its key interest rate by another 0.75%. Despite low unemployment rates, 71% of likely voters said the economy is going in the wrong direction, according to a recent Wall Street Journal poll. The drop of 11% in the Dow Jones index this year has not helped the public mood, especially among senior citizens on fixed incomes. Oddsmakers in Las Vegas are predicting that Republicans will win control of the U.S. Senate, but most experts agree several key Senate races are too close to call. Americans for the most part are looking forward to the election because it means an end to political ads on TV.
Ukrainians are working overtime to restore electricity and water after continued Russian cruise missile strikes against civilian infrastructure took a significant toll. President Zelensky called on EU member states for additional help to repair infrastructure. Moscow claims it has mobilized 300,000 men for its armed forces. After pressure from the UN, Russia appears to have restarted its participation in the Black Sea Initiative which allows Ukrainian grain to be shipped to world markets, but the pact remains tenuous.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin called North Korea’s November 3 test of an intercontinental ballistic missile and five short-range missiles “potentially destabilizing” and vowed to continue U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. North Korea said the joint exercises were a “provocation.”
In Brazil, left-leaning former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (age 77) narrowly defeated right wing populist incumbent Jair Bolsonaro. Mr. Bolsonaro appears to be prepared to hand over power but some of his supporters alleged election fraud and blocked roads as a show of protest. In Israel, former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured a parliamentary majority with the help of religious and ultra-nationalist allies (results still need to be certified). This would be Netanyahu’s third time serving as prime minister. These elections show that the United States is not the only country where politicians never seem to retire.
In diplomatic news, on November 4, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and a delegation of German industry CEOs made a controversial visit to Beijing — which Robert Gerber explores here in more detail — while G7 foreign ministers are meeting in Germany to coordinate messaging on Russia. Today the Wall Street Journal reported that the United States and China are trying to arrange a summit between President Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping on the margins of the G-20 summit, which will take place later this month in Indonesia
Egypt’s treatment of political prisoners and food security in that country are trending issues this week as diplomats prepare for the 27th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 27) which takes place next week in Sharm El-Sheikh.
CSPC Visiting Fellow Veera Parko had an OpEd on citizens´ resilience and national preparedness in support of national security published in The Hill newspaper. She underscores how resilient societies are those that bounce back after a severe crisis. Governments at the federal, state and local levels need to think strategically about future threats, and clearly articulate the danger and needed responses to an informed citizenry. Communities can then take steps to empower preparedness-minded citizens. This process can strengthen ties within and among communities, and, perhaps, bolster trust and national unity.
In this week’s Roundup, Veera offers an update on Finland and Sweden’s NATO aspirations, intern Jordan Trusel writes about the impact of COVID-based learning loss, Ethan Brown surveys Turkish-Greek tensions in the Aegean sea, and Andy Keiser examines legislation that would add Chinese top chip makers to the “Entities List.” Hidetoshi Azuma writes on Japan’s new joint command in the Japan Self-Defense Forces. We wrap up with news you may have missed.
NATO tension builds in the Mediterranean
Ethan Brown
There is a memorable quote from the Harry Potter books by Hogwarts’ Professor McGonagall, where she asks the story’s protagonists (Harry, Hermione and Ron) “why is it when something happens, it’s always you three?” The same question might rightly be directed by the NATO alliance at Turkey, one of its longest-tenured (and most powerful) member states. This is due to the increasing threat of conflict escalation in which Ankara is one of the key protagonists.
Its competitor, however and most concerning, is not Moscow, nor is it a rhetorical underground threat like the violently repressed Kurdish population in the region, or a shadowy and inimical regional power broker to President Erdogan’s vice-grip on power. It’s Greece — another equally long-tenured NATO member — who has the largest land army and one of the most powerful Air Force’s in the European NATO bloc.
So Professor McGonogals query — “why is it when something (potentially undermining NATO unity) happens, it’s always you”, seems apropos. This is not the first time Ankara has put its pivotal influence ahead of the responsibilities it owes via treatise to the alliance. Recall that a few years ago, the United States barred F-35 acquisitions for Turkey, after Ankara agreed to purchase Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile systems; the acquisition of those systems would have potentially (read: all but certainly) enabled Moscow to collect critical intelligence on 5th-generation stealth fighter capabilities. In 2017, Turkey bombed a stronghold of Kurdish YPG forces on the Syria-Turkey border despite those units being closely allied with coalition forces fighting ISIS — I was there watching the airstrikes over video-link and spent 24 straight hours trying to coordinate MEDEVAC flights and airspace cordons to help pacify the situation. Earlier this year — when Ukraine’s desperate and tenuous stand against Russia’s invading forces had pushed deeper NATO integration and opened the door for Finland and Sweden to join — Ankara opposed the expansion; only to recant its veto after agreeing to the extradition of Kurdish antagonists who had found refuge in Sweden.
Turkey of course remains one of the Alliance’s most critical members, especially when considering its role as the literal gatekeeper to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean byways, an issue I discussed in depth just a few months ago. The big takeaway from that analysis — Ankara’s efforts to do its own thing despite its critical role in the alliance is continuing to undermine NATOs credibility.
Greece and Turkey, despite being charter members of NATO since 1952, have long antagonized one another and decades of forced camaraderie have hardly eased tensions which pre-date the NATO entries. Even the membership has not prevented conflict between the two. In 1974, the two states were embroiled in confrontation over the island of Cyprus, initiated by partisans overthrowing the Athens-sponsored president and prompting a Turkish invasion; to this day, the island remains disputed along ethereal geography. Tensions occurred in 1973, 1987, 1996, and even as recently as 2020, when sovereign territorial disputes led to marshaled military force. Greece, for its part, is not without blame either; though among all of the European NATO members, Athens alone has met the 2%-of-GDP spending goal, which has always been a sticking point in alliance relations. In fact, Greece’s defense expenditures this year alone were the highest in the entire alliance. Yet many of those systems are not for the good of NATO, per se, but deliberately acquired and arrayed with an eye on Ankara. Its acquisition of French Rafale jets vastly exceed Turkeys air inventory capabilities (especially with the F-35 ouster), while beefing up its maritime capability for the explicit purpose of enforcing and defending it’s territorial ambitions in the Med; and it has even replicated Israel’s Iron Dome (purchased from Tel Aviv) in several of its Aegean Island blocs, for the exclusive purpose of deterring and defeating Turkeys prolific drone-swarm capability. It is the militarization of those islands, ostensibly, which serves as the current catalyst for rising tensions between the two.
Yet Athens has far less guilt in overtly upending NATO assurance and surety, made evident by the lack of efforts to foster ties with NATOs competitors (Moscow and Tehran, in particular, something Ankara certainly cannot claim). This all comes at a particularly delicate and difficult time for NATO, where the momentum for seeing an end to the Ukraine crisis fleetingly wavers on a possible final act of resolution, or at least an off-ramp to the crisis. The outbreak of war between two NATO states would certainly bolster Russia’s regional position, even if it teeters on collapse along its Ukrainian front lines; anything to discredit and upend NATO cohesion is a win in Moscow, even if the tangible battlefield benefits are not directly correlatory.
The two antagonists are not anywhere near resolution in this concentrated power competition; political leaders in Ankara stated publicly that any resolving of the affair must be done without third-party intervention (likely meaning that NATO should not involve itself in the crisis created by one of its own), while Greek politicians asserted that any threat to Aegean sovereignty precludes any hope of discourse on the matter (meaning any talks are sure to be zero-sum negotiations).
Strong rhetoric from two unruly parties is hardly a brake on what NATO and European leaders should consider as policy options. The crisis in Ukraine is more than enough for one region, and an outbreak of war between the two Mediterranean powers — who easily tout the most prolific defense inventories of the continent — must be avoided. Turkey is already in a corner of its own making, as the EU and United States have sided with Athens on the issue of territory, making this a question of incentivisation for Turkey to decide whether it cares to enjoy the stability that comes with alliance membership or not.
Both Greece and Turkey face national elections in the coming year, and the public discourse shows that the growing tension appears to very much be a politically-charged move by Erdogan and his nationalist party. That too, begs the question about how much of the strongman antics NATO is willing to continue to stomach from Ankara as the years go by. For now, the tension boils beneath the surface as NATO continues to focus on resolving Ukraine…a dynamic that benefits no one.
Turkey and Hungary hold the key to Finland and Sweden´s accession to NATO
Veera Parko
On November 1, Finland’s Prime Minister Sanna Marin urged Hungary and Turkey to ratify Finland and Sweden´s applications for NATO membership “preferably sooner rather than later”. Hungary and Turkey are the two countries that have not yet ratified Finland and Sweden´s membership.
Increasingly, there seem to be positive signals on upcoming ratifications from both Budapest and Ankara. The Hungarian Parliament will most probably soon decide on the timing of a debate on Finland and Sweden´s NATO bids, after having indicated earlier that a ratification would be forthcoming by the end of the year. The Turkish government’s rhetoric has been harsher: the spokesman for Turkey’s ruling party stressed that Turkey is not yet satisfied with Sweden´s promises to crack down on Kurdish separatists — one of the conditions Turkey has set for letting Finland and Sweden in — urging for more concrete steps. Sweden’s new center-right government has prioritized the country’s NATO membership, and the new Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson will travel to Ankara this week to meet his Turkish counterpart. Clearly, completing Finland and Sweden´s accession processes is a question of high importance also for the Alliance, and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg will meet President Erdogan next week to discuss NATO enlargement.
Despite active efforts from Sweden, Finland and NATO, Erdogan’s willingness to accept the Nordic nations’ NATO bids before next year’s elections in Turkey remains uncertain. On November 3, there were reports that a positive vote in the Turkish Parliament before the end of the year would be unlikely. In any case, pressure to go forward swiftly is mounting on all sides, not least because of the signals the continued stalling of Finnish and Swedish membership would send to NATO’s adversaries, especially Russia. As Stoltenberg put it ahead of his meeting with Erdogan on Friday: “In these dangerous times, it is even more important to finalize [Finland and Sweden’s] accession to prevent any misunderstanding or miscalculation in Moscow”.
Adding China’s National Champion Chipmakers to NDAA Procurement Ban Makes Good Sense
Andy Keiser
In two previous Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress (CSPC) papers here and here, we called for a series of recommendations against the Chinese domestic semiconductor (chips) industry as a matter of national and economic security.
Chinese-made chips are already in critical U.S. supply chains, including defense systems. Every day that goes by absent common-sense restrictions creates more potential for failure, espionage or sabotage.
Thankfully, in recent weeks, there has been a flood of new U.S. government export controls targeting the Chinese government-backed semiconductor industry — primarily coming out of the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). These actions are bold, comprehensive, and intended to prevent cutting-edge exports to a range of Chinese technology companies and cut off China’s ability to produce advanced chips itself.
Seemingly lost in the debate, however, has been important legislative action occurring in the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Leading China hawks Senators Chuck Schumer and John Cornyn got their amendment included in the manager’s amendment to the Senate version of the NDAA to add China’s three national champion chipmakers: Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT), and Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp. (YMTC) to Sec. 889 of the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA.
Sec. 889 of the 2019 NDAA created a federal procurement prohibition on telecommunications equipment or services from Huawei and ZTE, and surveillance equipment or services from Hikvision, Hytera and Dahua. This action was important to protect the integrity of critical telecommunications networks in the United States and protect Americans’ privacy.
Sec. 889 was also necessary to prevent taxpayer funding to Chinese Communist Party backed “national champions” who have known ties to China’s military and intelligence services and are complicit in gross human rights violations such as the Uighur genocide in Xinjiang province currently taking place. Chinese state backed chip makers are complicit and SMIC is already on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List.
As we discussed in previous CSPC papers, semiconductors are a critical national security commodity upon which the United States should not be forced to rely on our primary geopolitical adversary. The absence of semiconductor technology in Section 889 is an obvious omission from the larger macro policy efforts in Washington looking to reduce reliance China for critical components up and down the supply chain. Perhaps most concerningly, vulnerabilities introduced during the production of semiconductors can create an acute risk of compromise that could lead device failure or exfiltration of sensitive data.
While we should continue to push to add YMTC and CXMT to the Entity List, this Schumer/Cornyn amendment to the FY23 NDAA will bolster Section 889 to include these CCP-controlled semiconductor national champions and empower the interagency to identify any others with links to hostile foreign adversaries and then exclude them — using a flexible, effective, fair, and responsive tool already established under Sec. 889.
Healing From Covid-19 Significant Learning Loss
Jordan Trusel
The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic caused a surge of mass lockdowns across businesses and schools. According to UNICEF, COVID-19’s disturbance to education constitutes “the worst education crisis on record.” At the peak of the pandemic, 1.6 billion students across the globe had their education disrupted, furthering an already existing gap in learning for those in vulnerable positions. Kids, parents, teachers, and school leaders all faced difficulties as a result of the sudden adjustments to learning from the traditional face-to-face school that people were accustomed to. In some countries there was notable greater learning loss among girls, and the risk of child labor, early marriage, gender-based violence, and pregnancy all increased. In the United States, Black and Hispanic students were more likely to be in schools that remained remote for longer periods of time and city schools are more likely to have remote-only learning. In addition, minority students are less likely to have access to the prerequisites of learning such as devices and internet access. And while all students are suffering, students of color could be six to twelve months behind in contrast with white students being four to eight months behind. The National Assessment of Educational Progress reported steep declines in test scores to levels from two decades ago. In America, young school children around nine years old seem to have experienced a decline in math and reading, with the largest average score drop in reading since 1990, and the first-ever score decline in mathematics, according to the National Center for Education Statistics. Evidence from Brazil, Pakistan, rural India, South Africa, and Mexico, among others, also show substantial losses in math and reading.
While the school closings were justified in lieu of a deadly threat to public health, research suggests students have paid a hefty price. Teachers around the world have different styles of educating their classrooms but the overall consensus is that remote learning is largely ineffective. Closing schools not only interrupts teaching; but can also derail a key assessment period when exams are postponed or canceled. Learning assessments are a vital part of keeping track of whether students are behind, making progress, and where improvements can be made. The absence of the classroom and testing undermined the ability to assess how kids would be affected by school closings. When schools did reopen, many students and teachers still missed classes anyway because of COVID outbreaks. The combination of these challenges contributed to potential academic declines that may persist for years to come. Experts caution that we could be on the verge of losing an entire generation to substantial learning loss if action is not taken. In the United States it is also important to recognize how education is strongly correlated with income. Helping students recover is therefore essential for the hope of their prosperity in the future.
President Biden’s American Rescue Plan allocates $22 billion to addressing learning loss using “evidence-based interventions” for the “disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on underrepresented student subgroups.” As we are collectively now aware of the consequences of lost school time, the next step is to invest in high-quality instructional materials and programs directed at educator support. With the gaps in education having been highlighted due to COVID-19, we are also provided with the opportunity as a nation to reconvene and develop together. We need to deploy innovative best practice recovery programs, including scaling up tutoring, summer learning programs, and expanded learning time. It is essential to prepare children for a future workforce, and to reinstall hope in our educational system for every citizen so they may achieve whatever aspirations they may desire.
Mr. Scholz Goes to Beijing
Robert W. Gerber
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is leading a high-level German business delegation to Beijing on November 4. This makes him the first Western leader to meet with President Xi Jinping since Xi’s reappointment, and the first European leader to visit Beijing since Russia attacked Ukraine earlier this year. Scholz has been rightfully criticized for going to China despite that country’s refusal to condemn Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, among other Chinese afronts to basic human rights and the so-called “rule based order.” For his part, Scholz promised a “candid exchange” with Chinese leaders. In reality, Germany remains a major investor in China, and wants to press China for better market access and fair treatment for its companies. German car companies rely on China for 40% of their global sales (although local car companies are gaining ground on German rivals in the Chinese EV market). Scholtz also recently approved a deal that allowed a Chinese company to purchase 25% of a port terminal in Hamburg, despite the inherent national security concerns raised by German opposition politicians.
This is undoubtedly a prestigious visit for Xi Jinping. Furthermore, China needs German FDI and access to European markets more than ever to counterbalance historically low growth rates, high debt levels, and falling foreign investment in Chinese stocks. An early report quoting Chinese media indicated that Xi said today that he opposed the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons but did not criticize Russia nor call for Moscow to withdraw troops from Ukraine. Scholz said during a press conference following the meeting that he told President Xi “that it is important for China to use its influence on Russia.” Scholz’s trip seems out of sync with growing concerns across the EU about the inherent political, security, and moral risks of doing business with China. Smaller EU countries that have been victims of Chinese economic coercion would argue that Germany should be using its huge economic leverage to curb, rather than enable, Beijing’s worst behavior. And Scholz will have to explain to German voters — and EU partners — whether or not he put business first over European values.
Japan’s Emerging Joint Command
Hidetoshi Azuma
Last week, the Japanese government revealed that it was in the process of launching a joint command within the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) by 2024. The idea of creating a joint command itself is nothing new and has been under consideration at least for the last two decades as an attempt to ease the overwhelming responsibilities currently held by the Joint Chief of Staff. The real significance of the revelation was the timing, underscoring Tokyo’s growing uneasiness exacerbated by mounting regional security challenges, ranging from China’s aggressive designs for Taiwan to even the perceived uncertainty surrounding the future of the US Forces in Japan (USFJ). While today’s geopolitical landscape may urgently demand the creation of a joint command, trepidation must not trump prudence in guiding its creation.
The idea of a joint command has been on Tokyo’s agenda for a while. The main rationale for such an idea originally emerged as an operational imperative in streamlining the JSDF’s joint operations after the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the JSDF was essentially a rear support component of the USFJ during much of the Cold War, leading each branch to harness its respective expertise in service of US military efforts while remaining focused purely on the defense of the Japanese archipelago. For example, the Coastal Safety Force, the predecessor of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JSDF), engaged in covert minesweeping operations during the Korean War to support the US military’s ongoing operations across the peninsula. The upshot was the limited power vested in the hands of the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, who was merely a coordinator among the chiefs of staff of the three branches of the JSDF. While the end of the Cold War led Tokyo to increasingly recognize the importance of jointness in a new geopolitical environment and ultimately increase the power of the newly-established Joint Chief of Staff post in 2006, the empowered top military leader would ironically strengthen the need for a joint command.
The turning point arrived when the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami forced Tokyo to fundamentally rethink the scope of the Joint Chief’s responsibilities. The 2006 creation of the Joint Chief of Staff post led Japan’s highest-ranking military officer to assume staff responsibilities comparable to those of the US Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff as well as even the operational command of the JSDF. In other words, the Japanese Joint Chief of Staff plays the dual role of chief of staff and commander. This peculiar arrangement led the then-Joint Chief of Staff, General Ryoichi Oriki, to become overwhelmed by the triple task of advising the prime minister, commanding the three branches of the JSDF, and coordinating with the USFJ during the joint US-Japan Operation Tomodachi in response to the 2011 natural disasters. Indeed, Japan’s top military officer later recalled that he had found himself spending “60% of [his] time on advising the prime minister and coordinating with the USFJ and 40% on actual operations” during the disaster relief operations, revealing fundamental flaws in his previous post. General Oriki’s experience exposed the urgent need for a separate joint command, subsequently fueling debates at the Japanese Diet.
The emergence of new security threats in the 2010s also drove Tokyo’s recognition of the need for a joint command. China’s expanding gray-zone operations in the East and South China Seas presented a serious challenge to the 2010 Dynamic Defense doctrine, leading Tokyo to upgrade it to Joint Dynamic Mobile Defense in 2013. Russia’s growing hybrid warfare threats from Ukraine to even the US also spurred a further upgrade of the evolving doctrine, leading to the emergence of Multi-dimensional Joint Dynamic Defense in 2018, which drew inspiration from the US concept of multi-domain battle. The common thread penetrating these evolving doctrines is the need for boosting the JSDF’ jointness at the operational level to achieve seamless defense against emerging gray-zone and hybrid threats. The flip side of the coin is Tokyo’s strategy of driving a doctrinal evolution before tackling the more politically-ambitious, if not toilsome, task of creating a joint command in a country still largely dominated by pacifist sentiments. As a result, the idea of creating a joint command gradually gained currency in Japan especially after the launch of the 2018 doctrine.
Therefore, the latest revelation of Tokyo’s plan to establish a joint command by 2024 was no surprise, but its real significance was the timing. The creation of a joint command would inevitably mean a proverbial “Japan that can wage wars” often referenced by the country’s anti-war opposition. For this reason, Tokyo did not specify an exact timeline for implementing the idea for years and instead opted to allow geopolitics to drive the Japanese public home on the need for a joint command. 2022 has so far proven to be a particularly fortuitous year for Tokyo’s agenda due to mounting geopolitical problems, ranging from Russia’s war in Ukraine to China’s impending aggression over Taiwan in addition to the increasing frequency of North Korea’s routine missile launches against Japan. Added to this familiar trio of threats is Tokyo’s growing consternations over the future of Washington’s regional security commitment. Indeed, many in Japan’s political establishment deplore perceived US retrenchment especially after its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. Such a perception further consolidated after the recent US decision to replace the F15 squadrons permanently stationed in Okinawa with rotational forces at a time Tokyo was seeking to firmly anchor Japan as an indispensable part of Washington’s agenda of integrated deterrence. Against this backdrop, Tokyo’s decision last week underscored both its anxiety and resolve to bear increased defense burden in an increasingly volatile, uncertain regional security environment.
While the coming creation of a joint command in Japan would be a welcome development conducive to the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, it demands prudent guidance to maximize its desired effects. Indeed, a decision rarely comes by in Japan’s consensus-driven culture, and the rather hasty decision-making process surrounding the agenda of a joint command should discipline any optimism for its implementation. For example, Tokyo has yet to clarify the exact place in the chain of command for the proposed joint command. While relieving the Joint Chief of Staff from his irregular command role would streamline the existing chain of command, elevating the proposed joint command to the same level as the Joint Staff Office just below the Minister of Defense may risk the same organizational canker which paralyzed the Imperial Japanese Army to a catastrophic end. If history is any guide, the Imperial Japanese Army experience teaches that Japan’s own cultural obstacles would almost perpetually stand in the way of effective coordination between staff and command. For now, the current debate in Tokyo endorses the idea of having the Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) as the counterpart for the commander of the expected joint command, implying the possibility of his subordination to the Joint Chief of Staff.
Additional issues will likely abound as Tokyo seeks to establish a joint command. Apart from Japan’s national culture, its organizational culture driven by tribalism bodes ill for the effective implementation of a joint command. While service rivalries no longer lead to blood vendettas as in the 1930s, they still overshadow the internal dynamics of the JSDF, and the creation of another major joint post would likely further exacerbate it. Apart from these human factors, the JSDF still fundamentally remains divided in terms of C4ISR and other functions. Indeed, one of the most important lessons from Operation Tomodachi is that it still remains to this day the JSDF’s first and last joint military operation involving all three branches apart from their regular exercises. Since then, the JSDF have achieved rapid force modernization, but the divided acquisition pipelines would inevitably cause serious impediments to joint operations in emerging domains, such as cyberspace and electromagnetic fields. Likewise, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Japan’s Defense Intelligence Agency equivalent, could prove wanting unless its existing responsibilities were to include providing intelligence to the proposed joint command.
While these issues do not necessarily translate into a bleak future for the proposed joint command, the idea itself merits further exploration for effective policy. If history is any guide, the proposed joint command will likely suffer many of the inevitable issues discussed above. The JSDF are fundamentally an quasi-military with no combat experience and have a myriad of legal and organizational problems destined to impede its wartime functions. For example, the current JSDF law holds that its personnel are special government officials instead of armed combatants and therefore remain unencumbered by any legal consequences in case of resignation or the possibility of trials at the court martial. In other words, the existing flaws intrinsic to the JSDF would immediately manifest themselves with or without a joint command. Add to this the inevitable organizational inertia caused by the ever-familiar service rivalries.
The chief issue with the current policy discourse in Tokyo on the idea of creating a joint command is that it has become an end in and of itself. The key imperative for Tokyo is to boost integrated deterrence with the US. While the proposed joint command would contribute to this end, it would not suffice given the evolving geopolitical environment surrounding Japan. Indeed, Japan is no longer America’s Cold War bulwark against communism separated from Eurasian’s continental threats by the Sea of Japan. In the age of great power competition rife with hybrid threats and hypersonic missiles, the Japanese territories themselves could easily become a battleground of its own. A more sensible end goal for rethinking the JSDF’s jointness would be to consider the ever-controversial proposition of ultimately establishing a joint US-Japan command similar to the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. Such a bilateral architecture would ensure integrated deterrence with the US as desired by Tokyo. Moreover, it would remove the cause for concern for the JSDF’s wartime command due to their perennial lack of experience and the unending service rivalries.
Tokyo’s latest agenda of creating a joint command is certainly a welcome development in the evolution of the US-Japan alliance. It signifies its determination to bear increased security burden for a more equal relationship with the US. However, the idea still remains rather nascent and would require further consolidation before it is ready for implementation. Indeed, Tokyo must reflect on its pre-WWII predecessor’s catastrophic failure stemming from a flawed distribution of power between staff and command. The haste with which the decision was reached was largely a response to the emerging geopolitical landscape overshadowing Japan. While trepidation can understandably be a major driver behind decision-making, prudence must reign over impulses. Given Japan’s long security dormancy, such prudence would likely be a far cry before finding its proper place. Tokyo may as well reflect on the catastrophic demise of its predecessor stemming largely from a major flaw created when designing a modern military. Its task is monumental, and the test of Japan’s wartime leadership would likely begin with guiding the creation of a joint command with prudence toward full-fledged integrated deterrence with its American ally.
News You May Have Missed
FBI Investigates Former CIA Operative for Spying for Qatar
The FBI is reportedly investigating the case of a former CIA operative who allegedly ran a “sprawling covert influence operation” on behalf of Qatar to help secure that country’s successful bid for the 2022 World Cup. One of the operative’s goals was to discredit U.S. officials who were against Qatar’s World Cup bid (the United States was also competing for the World Cup at the time). Qatar, which happens to host the forward headquarters of the U.S. Central Command is already under heavy criticism for the deaths of foreign construction workers, bribery of FIFA officials, and trying to “sportswash” the country’s human rights record.
Spain Closes Airspace After Concerns About Chinese Rocket Debris
On November 4, Spanish authorities briefly closed their country’s airspace to mitigate the risk of debris falling from the Chinese Long March 5B rocket which is making an “uncontrolled reentry.” The EU Space Surveillance and Tracking service said parts of Southern Italy were also at risk. The rocket had been servicing the Chinese space station. Travelers in Barcelona and Ibiza faced airport closures and travel delays, which some of them used as a perfect excuse to extend their vacations in Spain.
The views of authors are their own and not that of CSPC.
